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Zoning and Land Use Law
by Newton M. Galloway *
Steven L. Jones **
During the Survey period, 1 the Supreme Court of the United States
in Knick v. Township of Scott 2 gave aggrieved property owners in Georgia
a federal taking claim for inverse condemnation resulting from a zoning
regulation that the Georgia Supreme Court had previously denied them
under state law in Diversified Holdings, LLP v. City of Suwanee. 3 The
Georgia Court of Appeals further refined York v. Athens College of
Ministry. 4 Finally (on a note inseparable with zoning), the Georgia
Supreme Court encountered a case defining the parameters of the
Georgia Open Meetings Act.
I. KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT: A TAKINGS CLAIM IN FEDERAL COURT
During this Survey period, the most significant change in Georgia
zoning and land use law comes from the Supreme Court of the United
States in Knick v. Township of Scott, 5 which changed the legal landscape
governing inverse condemnation (i.e., regulatory taking) actions in
Georgia. In Knick, the Supreme Court held that a property owner whose
property has been taken through application of a regulation (zoning or
otherwise) may bypass Georgia state courts and immediately pursue a
*Partner, Galloway & Lyndall, LLP. Mercer University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University,
Walter F. Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1981); Member, Mercer Law Review (1979–1981).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Associate, Bovis, Kyle, Burch & Medlin, LLC. University of Georgia (B.B.A., 2012);
Mercer University, Walter F. Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, Mercer Law
Review (2014–2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1 This article surveys zoning and land use decisions decided between June 1, 2019 and
May 29, 2020. For an analysis of zoning and land use law during the prior survey period,
see Newton M. Galloway & Steven L. Jones, Zoning and Land Use Law, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 363 (2019).
2 Knick v. Twp. Of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
3 302 Ga. 597, 807 S.E.2d 876 (2017).
4 348 Ga. App. 58, 821 S.E.2d 120 (2018).
5 139 S. Ct. 2162, (2019).
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damages claim in federal court under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 6 pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 7 The expansion of property rights in Knick contrasts
starkly with Diversified Holdings, in which the Georgia Supreme Court
prohibited an analogous state-law taking claim resulting from inverse
condemnation by zoning regulation. 8 As a result, Knick’s impact on
Georgia law is properly analyzed in this Survey of Georgia zoning and
land use law.
A. The Facts and Holding of Knick
The bucolic facts of Knick belie its legal significance. Rose Mary Knick
owned ninety acres in Scott Township, Pennsylvania. She lived in a
single-family home on the property, grazing horses and farm animals in
her pastures. Located on Ms. Knick’s property is a small cemetery where
family members and neighbors were allegedly buried. 9
In 2012, Scott Township passed an ordinance that required “[a]ll
cemeteries . . . be kept open and accessible to the general public during
daylight hours.” 10 The ordinance allowed code enforcement officers to
enter Ms. Knick’s property to identify the existence and location of a
cemetery. In 2013, a code enforcement officer visited Ms. Knick, entered
her property, and found several grave markers. Ms. Knick was cited for
violation of the ordinance. 11
Ms. Knick was not amused. Initially, she filed suit in state court
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that the Scott
Township cemetery ordinance “effected a taking of her property.” 12 This
suit did not seek compensation for the taking of her property through an
inverse condemnation claim, which was available to her under
Pennsylvania law. While Ms. Knick’s suit was pending, Scott Township
(possibly recognizing its regulatory overreach) withdrew the violation
notice. With the enforcement action terminated, the state court declined
to rule on Ms. Knick’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. 13
Undeterred, Ms. Knick filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
federal court alleging that the cemetery ordinance, as applied to her
property, violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 14 Citing
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
8 302 Ga. 597, 807 S.E.2d 876 (2017).
9 Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
6
7
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Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 15 the district court dismissed Ms. Knick’s takings claim
“because she had not [first] pursued an inverse condemnation action in
state court.” 16 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court. 17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider Williamson
and determine whether “property owners must seek just compensation
under state law in state court before bringing a federal taking claim
under [Section] 1983.” 18
Based on the facts presented by Ms. Knick in support of her taking
claim, the Supreme Court overruled, and decreed that “[c]ontrary to[,]
Williamson County, a property owner has a claim for a violation of the
Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his property for public use
without paying for it.” 19 The Supreme Court went on to state that: “[t]he
Fifth Amendment right to full compensation arises at the time of the
taking, regardless of post-taking remedies that may be available to the
property owner.” 20 The Supreme Court’s conservative majority (quoting
the dissent of liberal Justice William Brennan in San Diego Gas &
Electric Company. v. San Diego 21) explained that “‘once there is a ‘taking,’
compensation must be awarded because ‘[a]s soon as private property has
been taken, whether through formal condemnation proceedings,
occupancy, physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner has already
suffered a constitutional violation.’” 22 While compensation may remedy
the taking later, the Court held that the constitutional violation occurs
at the time of the taking, and it concluded that “because a taking without
compensation violates the self-executing Fifth Amendment at the time of
the taking, the property owner can bring a federal suit at that time.” 23
The property owner is not required to exhaust state remedies before
seeking relief in federal court. 24 Under Knick, a property owner with a

473 U.S. 172 (1985).
Knick, 139 S. Ct 2162 at 2169. The Court noted that an inverse condemnation claim
is distinct from direct condemnation. Pennsylvania law recognizes an inverse condemnation
claim. Id. at 2168.
17 Knick v. Twp. Of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017).
18 Knick, 139 S. Ct. 1262, 1269.
19 Id. at 2170.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 2175; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 624–26 (1981). San
Diego Gas & Electric, a public utility, sued after the City of San Diego rezoned its property
reducing the amount of industrially zoned land. The utility alleged a taking of its property
by inverse condemnation.
22 Knicks, 139 S. Ct. at 2172 (emphasis in original) (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.
v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (J.Brennan, dissenting)).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 2172–73.
15
16
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valid taking claim is entitled to compensation as if it had been “‘paid
contemporaneously with the taking’—that is, the compensation must
generally consist of the total value of the property when taken, plus
interest from that time.” 25
B. Knick’s Impact on Georgia Law
In Knick, the Supreme Court reached a legal conclusion diametrically
opposed to the Georgia Supreme Court’s recent decision in Diversified
Holdings. 26 The Georgia Supreme Court held in Diversified Holdings
that a taking of property through inverse condemnation from a zoning
regulation action cannot occur unless “the owner [is] completely deprived
of the use of the property.” 27 It noted (citing supporting federal
authorities) that a taking claim resulting from a zoning regulation is
inconsistent with the theory of inverse condemnation and that “[u]nder
a true takings challenge . . . , ‘the focus of the takings analysis is on
whether the government act takes property, not on whether the
government has a good or bad reason for its action.’” 28 Zoning, the
Georgia Supreme Court continued, “does not ordinarily present the kind
of affirmative public use at the expense of the property owner that effects
a taking,” 29 and it is “unlikely to be a fertile ground for inverse
condemnation claims.” 30
To reach its decision, the court distinguished eminent domain from the
exercise of the government’s regulatory police power, such as zoning and
land use restrictions. 31 Though the same distinction was noted by the
Supreme Court in Knick, 32 the Georgia Supreme Court reached the
opposite conclusion in Diversified Holdings. 33 Under Georgia law, a
takings claim is viable only when the government exercises the power of
eminent domain, not when the taking results from a zoning regulation—
although the plain text of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Constitution of the State of Georgia 34 indicates otherwise. 35
Id. at 2170 (quoting D. Dana & T. Merrill, Property: Takings 262 (2002)).
The holding of Diversified Holdings was discussed in Zoning and Land Use, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 70 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2018).
27 302 Ga. at 608, 807 S.E.2d at 886.
28 Id. at 609–10, 807 S.E.2d at 887 (quoting Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential
Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due
Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343, 354 (2005)).
29 Id. at 610, 807 S.E.2d at 878.
30 Id., 807 S.E.2d at 877.
31 Id. at 607–08, 807 S.E.2d at 886–88.
32 139 S. Ct. at 2168.
33 302 Ga. at 610, 807 S.E.2d at 887.
34 GA. CONST. of 1983, art. I, §3, para. 1.
35 Diversified Holdings, LLP, 302 Ga. at 615, 807 S.E.2d at 891 (J., Peterson, concurring):
25
26
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In Diversified Holdings, Georgia Supreme Court held:
The balance our law strikes is that a zoning classification that
substantially burdens a property owner may be justified if it bears a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality, or general
welfare . . . . Lacking that kind of justification, the zoning may be set
aside as arbitrary or capricious. If a land-use regulation is arbitrary
and capricious then the regulation cannot stand. The remedies
available in such cases include declaring the regulation unlawful as
applied to the property at issue, although we’ve been clear that courts
should give local governing bodies a reasonable opportunity to
reconsider rezoning applications or otherwise take action to confirm
their regulations to the law. 36

As a result, under Diversified Holdings, a Georgia property owner’s
property cannot be “taken” by inverse condemnation from a zoning
restriction, and the value of the property “taken” is not compensable by
damages. 37 The property owner must challenge the zoning regulation in
court and prove that the regulation is a substantial burden on the
property and not substantially related to the public health, safety,
morality, or general welfare, or is arbitrary and capricious. 38 If the
property owner makes either showing, the zoning regulation will be
declared unlawful, and the court will remand the case back to the zoning
authority, which will be given the opportunity to cure the zoning
regulation’s arbitrariness and capriciousness. 39
The text of our Just Compensation Clause appears broader than the federal
Takings Clause. The Takings Clause reads ‘nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.’ U.S. Const. Amend. V. But the Just
Compensation Clause provides (subject to a variety of subsequent textual
exceptions) that ‘private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid.’ GA. CONST.
of 1983, art. I, § 3, para. 1(a) (emphasis supplied). This textual difference
between the Clauses seems to me significant enough to raise questions about the
validity of our caselaw often interpreting the Clauses as essentially the same.
Answering those questions would require our careful consideration of text,
context, and history. And this provision of the Georgia Constitution has a
particularly complex history; although present in every Constitution since 1861,
its form has changed in some fashion in each new Constitution. But no party has
raised or briefed such issues here, and so I leave them for another day.
Id.
36 Id., 807 S.E.2d at 888.
37 Id. at 611, 807 S.E.2d at 888.
38 Id., 807 S.E.2d at 888. This requirement appears consistent with the Georgia appellate
courts’ efforts to transform legislative zoning decisions into quasi-judicial administrative
actions which are reviewed under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard. See e.g., City of
Cumming v. Flowers, 300 Ga. 820, 792 S.E.2d 846 (2017).
39 See Diversified Holdings, LPP, 302 Ga. at 611, 807 S.E.2d at 888.
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When the holdings of Knick and Diversified Holdings are applied to
the facts in Knick, the contradictory results are striking. In Knick, the
regulation applied to Ms. Knick’s property constituted a taking at the
time of enactment, and she was entitled to damages for the taking and
interest from that date. 40 Under Diversified Holdings (if Ms. Knick’s farm
had been in Georgia), the zoning authority’s zoning regulation could not
have taken Ms. Knick’s property. Instead, she would have been required
to prove in court that the zoning regulation failed one of the tests under
Diversified Holdings. If her challenge succeeded, Ms. Knick’s case would
have been remanded to the zoning authority to correct the regulation,
giving the zoning authority a “redo,” while Ms. Knick remained
uncompensated. These results could not be more different.
C. Choosing a Zoning Remedy and Forum under Knick
After the Knick opinion, significant speculation questioned its impact.
Initial reactions suggested that Knick will increase the amount of federal
litigation involving local zoning issues as more regulatory taking claims
are asserted alleging a broader range of possible takings. 41 Even in states
that allow a taking claim for inverse condemnation, increased federal
litigation is inevitably expected. Also, suits for damages resulting from
the taking of property by zoning regulation that assert state law claims
in addition to Section 1983 claims, will present more problems associated
with the federal courts’ pendant, or supplemental jurisdiction.
However, the response to Knick in Georgia may be more dynamic since
Diversified Holdings prohibits an inverse condemnation taking claim
under Georgia law from a zoning regulation. After Knick, an aggrieved
property owner in Georgia can choose between cumulative remedies and
forums. The property owner may now:
a. Seek a declaration that the zoning regulation is unlawful and
cannot be applied to the owner’s property; and
b. If the claim is brought in federal court, seek a damage claim
resulting from the taking of property under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Knick provides a direct path to federal court for relief for the aggrieved
property owner. Of course, the property owner may bring a damage claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court, and the federal court will have
pendant jurisdiction over state law claims. Knick opens the door directly
to federal relief.
Different evidentiary standards may also be a factor favoring the
aggrieved property owner’s decision to seek federal relief. A taking claim
in federal court should follow the path of a traditional Section 1983 case
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172.
Dwight Merriam, Rose Mary Knick and the Story of Chicken Little, MUNICIPAL
LAWYER, 653–654 (July–August, 2020).
40
41
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seeking damages which will be resolved by a preponderance of the
evidence standard. 42 For state law claims, the burden on the aggrieved
property owner will give the zoning authority the benefit of having the
legality of the decision assessed to determine whether (1) there was “any
evidence” to support it, if it was a quasi-judicial decision; (2) if it was a
legislative decision, whether the current zoning regulation substantially
burdens a property and, if it does, whether that regulation is
substantially related to the public health, safety, morality, or general
welfare; or (3) for either classification, “[w]hether the [authority] acted
beyond the discretionary powers conferred upon it, abused its discretion,
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously with regard to an individual’s
constitutional rights.” 43 A successful challenge to a zoning regulation
when it is reviewed under the “any evidence” rule will be rare, unless it
can be shown that the zoning authority acted egregiously or in bad faith.
Likewise, legislative actions are presumptively valid. 44 As a result, the
distinction between the evidentiary standards may make a federal action
more appealing to the aggrieved property owner.
However, there may be a downside to federal relief if the pursuit of a
damage claim allowed by Knick precludes remedies declaring the zoning
regulation arbitrary and enjoining its enforcement, as allowed by
Diversified Holdings. Prior to Diversified Holdings, the aggrieved party
owner’s complaint would have alleged counts seeking both (1) damages
resulting from the taking; and (2) injunctive and declaratory relief to
declare the zoning regulation void and to enjoin its enforcement.
Generally, these declaratory and injunctive remedies are not available to
a property owner who has an adequate remedy at law through damages
awarded as a result of the taking. 45 Consequently, the damages awarded
for the taking of property by Knick may preclude injunctive and
declaratory relief available under Diversified Holdings. If the property
owner’s ultimate goal is to develop the property which is taken by the
zoning regulation, injunctive and declaratory relief may be better
remedies than damages. Damages will compensate the aggrieved owner
for the value of the taking, but the regulation may remain in place.
II. GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS REGARDING SPECIAL USE
PERMITS FUTHER REFINE CITY OF CUMMING V. FLOWERS
A. A Brief History of the Turbulent Classifications of Zoning and Land
Hous. Auth. Of Augusta v. Gould, 305 Ga. 545, 553–54, 826 S.E.2d 107, 113 (2019).
Clayton County v. New Image Towing and Recovery, Inc., 351 Ga. App. 340, 342–43,
830 S.E.2d 805, 808 (2019); Diversified Holdings, LLP, 302 Ga. 661, 807 S.E.2d at 889.
44 301 Ga. at 612, 807 S.E.2d at 889.
45 O.C.G.A. § 23-1-4 (2020).
42
43
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Use Decisions
In City of Cumming v. Flowers, 46 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
a “quasi-judicial” decision by a local government official, board, or
governing authority must be appealed by petition for writ of certiorari to
superior court. 47 The impact of City of Cumming (and its progeny) was
discussed in each Survey after it issued, and the distinction between
whether a local government decision is legislative or a quasi-judicial
decision has become critically important. 48 A legislative zoning decision
may be directly appealed and a de novo standard of review is applied to
law and facts, with new evidence permissibly introduced. 49 A quasijudicial decision is appealed by petition for writ of certiorari to the
superior court which sits as an appellate judiciary. 50 The “any evidence”
standard applies, limiting the superior court’s review to the facts,
evidence, and issues raised before the local governmental body or
official. 51 The court still reviews legal issues de novo, albeit with some
deference to the local government. 52
The adoption of a zoning ordinance and/or map along with the rezoning
of a specific parcel (which amends the zoning map) have historically been
deemed to be legislative actions. 53 Decisions on variances, plat approval
(preliminary and final), and approval of building and construction
permits have long been deemed quasi-judicial since they do not amend
the local government’s zoning ordinance. 54 These characterizations
300 Ga. 802, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017).
City of Cumming, 300 Ga. at 833–34, 797 S.E.2d at 857.
48 A legislative decision is a “general inquiry” not bound to specific circumstances, facts,
people, or property, rather it “results in a rule of law or course of policy that will apply in
the future.” York, 348 Ga. App. 58, 60, 821 S.E.2d 120, 123 (quoting Diversified Holdings,
LLP, 302 Ga. at 601–02, 807 S.E.2d at 882). In contrast, a quasi-judicial decision applies
facts to criteria set forth in black-letter law and results in the establishment of rights and
obligations or resolves specific disputes. In other words, those decisions are “‘tightly
controlled by the ordinance.’” RCG Properties, LLC v. City of Atlanta Bd. of Zoning
Adjustments, 260 Ga. App. 355, 361, 579 S.E.2d 782, 787 (2003) (a special use permit case)
(quoting LaFave v. City of Atlanta, 258 Ga. 631, 632, 373 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2003) (emphasis
added) (a variance case)).
49 Stendahl v. Cobb Cnty, 284 Ga. 525, 525–27, 668 S.E.2d 723, 726 (2008).
50 City of Dunwoody v. Discovery Practice MGMT., Inc., 338 Ga. App. 135, 138, 789
S.E.2d 386, 389 (2016) (“‘The substantial-evidence standard [under O.C.G.A. § 4-12(b)] is
effectively the same as the any-evidence standard.’”).
51 O.C.G.A. § 5-4-12 (2020); York, 348 Ga. App. at 63, 821 S.E.2d at 125.
52 See e.g., Clayton Cnty, 351 Ga. App. at 347, 830 S.E.2d at 811.
53 See City Council of Augusta v. Irvin, 109 Ga. App. 598, 600, 137 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1964);
see also Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga 262, 265, 219 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1975).
54 See Cumming, 300 Ga. App. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848; RCG Properties, LLC, 260 Ga.
App. at 361, 579 S.E.2d at 786 (2003); Emory Univ. v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894, 896–97, 401
S.E.2d 691, 694 (1991):
46
47
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precede and are consistent with the definition of a “zoning decision,”
under the Georgia Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL), 55 as a final legislative
action by a local government which results in a zoning ordinance being
adopted or textually amended or an amendment to the zoning map when
property is rezoned or annexed into a municipality. 56 However, ZPL also
defines as a legislative, zoning decision “the grant of a permit relating to
a special use of property.” 57
Though a variance was at issue in City of Cumming, dicta therein
suggested that the Supreme Court might apply its holding to an appeal
of a decision involving a “permit relating to a special use of property [an
(SUP)].” An SUP approves land uses that are not permitted within a
zoning district as a matter of right, but may be compatible with permitted
uses allowed in the zoning district at a specific location. 58 In other words,
“the ordinance provides that [the SUP] shall be allowed only upon the
condition that it be approved by the appropriate governmental body”
pursuant to analysis of approval criteria set out in the ordinance. 59
In fact, the Georgia Supreme Court applied City of Cumming to an
SUP in York v. Athens College of Ministry, Inc. 60 A majority of the court
in York held that granting the SUP was a quasi-judicial decision because
the local government was required to apply criteria of approval for the
SUP set out in the zoning ordinance, 61 and the superior court’s review
was limited to the “any evidence” standard. 62 Having failed to challenge
the opponents’ standing below, Athens College of Ministry (ACM) and the
County could not challenge the opponents’ standing for the first time on
appeal in superior court. 63
This Court has never set forth the standard of review to be applied by a superior
court in reviewing whether the evidence presented to a local administrative
agency or local governing body supports the grant or denial of a variance. We
now hold that the any-evidence standard is the appropriate standard of review.
Id.
55 O.C.G.A. §§ 36-66-1–36-66-6 (2020).
56 O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4) (2020).
57 Id.
58 City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving & Storage Co., 245 Ga. 794, 267 S.E.2d 234, 235
(1980).
59 City of Cumming, 300 Ga. at 826 n. 5, 797 S.E.2d at 853 n. 5.
60 348 Ga. App. 58, 821 S.E.2d 120.
61 York, 348 Ga. App at 61, 821 S.E.2d at 124 (citing City of Cumming, 300 Ga at 823–
24, 797 S.E.2d at 850–51).
62 Id. at 59-60, 821 S.E.2d at 123 (“When a party seeks certiorari review in the trial court
of a decision of an administrative body acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, the trial court is
bound by the facts and evidence presented to the administrative body.”).
63 Id. at 60, 821 S.E.2d at 123. The York majority gave no credence to the ordinance’s
characterization of the decision because “‘substance matters far more than form, and the
courts need not capitulate to the label that a government body places on its action.’” Id. at

376

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

In an attempt to reconcile ZPL with its decision, the York majority
noted that ZPL “defines a ‘zoning decision,’ not [an SUP] or ‘special use
approval decision.’” 64 Judge Goss’s dissent in York distinguished City of
Cumming based on a textualist interpretation of ZPL, finding a
distinction between an SUP that involves the change in use of land to a
use “potentially incompatible with uses allowed in the particular zoning
district” and an SUP that does not involve a change in use of the real
estate at issue. 65
Despite the results in City of Cumming and York, since Guhl v.
Holcomb Bridge Road Corporation 66 was decided in 1977, Georgia law
has required local governing authorities to analyze objective criteria
when taking action on a rezoning application, a legislative act. In Guhl,
the Georgia Supreme Court established the factors that must be
considered to determine whether the current zoning district applied to
property is constitutional. 67 Guhl’s requirements are established
precedent. Analysis of a rezoning application under the Guhl factors (and
its lineage) is required when a local government’s decision on a rezoning
application is appealed to superior court. 68 Guhl’s factors foreshadowed
ZPL which requires that a local government’s zoning ordinance include
“standards governing the exercise of the [constitutionally delegated
legislative] zoning power [which] . . . may include any factors . . . the local
government finds relevant in balancing the interest in promoting the
public health, safety, morality, or general welfare against the right to the

62 n. 6, 821 S.E.2d at 124 n. 6 (quoting State of Georgia v. Int’l Keystone Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 402, 799 S.E.2d 455, 463 (2016)).
64 Id. at 61–62 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)). Therefore, ZPL’s definition “does not, on
its face, make a local government’s issuance of any and all ‘permit[s] related to a special
use of property’ ‘legislative action[s],’ regardless of the process that was used to make any
such decision.” Id. at 62.
65 York, 348 Ga. App. at 64, 821 S.E.2d at 126 (J., Goss, dissenting) (quoting Druid Hills
Civic Ass’n. v. Buckler, 328 Ga. App. 485, 493, 760 S.E.2d 194, 201 (2014)).
66 238 Ga. 322, 232 S.E.2d 830 (1977).
67 Guhl, 238 Ga. at 323–24, 232 S.E.2d at 831–32. (citing La Salle National Bank v.
County of Cook, 60 Ill. Ap. 2d 39, 51, 208 S.E.2d 430, 436 (1965)). Those factors are as
follows:
(1) existing uses and zoning of nearby property; (2) the extent to which property
values are diminished by the particular zoning districts; (3) the extent to which
the destruction of property values of the plaintiffs promotes the health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the public; (4) the relative gain to the public, as
compared to the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner; (5) the
suitability of the subject property for the zoned purposes; and (6) the length of
time the property has been vacant as zoned, considered in the context of land
development in the area in the vicinity of the property.
Id.
68 E.g., Diversified Holdings, LLP, 302 Ga. at 608–09, 612, 807 S.E.2d at 887, 889.
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unrestricted use of property.” 69 During the Survey period, two SUP cases
revisited the same question: how to distinguish between quasi-judicial
and legislative decisions under City of Cumming and York, and the same
court reached different, potentially irreconcilable conclusions in each.
B. Riverdale Land Group, LLC v. Clayton County—the Georgia Court of
Appeals Holds Approval of an SUP is a Quasi-Judicial Decision
In Riverdale Land Group, LLC v. Clayton County, 70 the Riverdale
Land Group (RLG) applied for an SUP to construct and operate a gas
station. 71 The Clayton County Board of Commissioners (BOC) denied the
SUP application. 72 RLG filed a petition for writ of mandamus action
appealing the denial of RLG’s application. 73 The Georgia Court of
Appeals held that a writ of mandamus was not a proper mechanism to
challenge the BOC’s denial of the SUP application because the SUP was
quasi-judicial. 74 “[When] an official or agency’s action is ‘subject to review
by certiorari, the writ of mandamus is unavailable.’” 75 Because RLG did
not petition for a writ of certiorari, it waived its constitutional claims. 76
To determine whether the denial was a quasi-judicial act, the Court
relied on Housing Authority of City of Augusta v. Gould, 77 (decided after
City of Cumming) which set forth the following three characteristics
indicative of a quasi-judicial decision. 78 First, a quasi-judicial act occurs
when all parties are entitled to notice and a hearing with the opportunity
to present evidence under judicial forms of procedure. 79 Second, a
quasi-judicial act is a decision-making process that (quasi-) legislative
law requires be made applying relevant facts to pre-existing (i.e. codified)
legal standards. 80 Third, a quasi-judicial act is final and binding on the
rights of interested parties. 81 The court also recited the Georgia Supreme
Court’s prior characterization of administrative determinations as being

69 O.C.G.A. § 36-6-5 (2020). ZPL also requires that local governments “adopt policies and
procedures which govern calling and conducting hearings required by [ZPL Section 4].”
70 354 Ga. App. 1, 840 S.E.2d 132 (2020).
71 Id. at 1–2, 840 S.E.2d at 133.
72 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 133.
73 Id. at 2, 840 S.E.2d at 133.
74 Id. at 3, 840 S.E.2d at 134; O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2020).
75 354 Ga. App. 3, 840 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Bibb Cnty. v. Monroe Cnty., 294 Ga. 730,
734, 755 S.E.2d 766 (2014)).
76 Id. at 9–10,840 S.E.2d at 138.
77 305 Ga. 545, 826 S.E.2d 107 (2019).
78 Id. at 551, 826 S.E.2d at 111–12.
79 Id., 826 S.E.2d at 111–12.
80 Id., 826 S.E.2d at 111–12.
81 Id., 826 S.E.2d at 111–12.
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particular and immediate, and legislative decisions as general and
prospective. 82
Like the York court, the court in Riverdale Land Group, LLC found
the facts at issue substantially similar to those presented in City of
Cumming, and held that the BOC’s decision on the SUP was quasijudicial. 83 As in City of Cumming, the applicant was required by the
applicable ordinance to submit detailed information regarding a “specific
piece of property,” and the ordinance also required the BOC to “determine
‘the facts and apply the ordinance’s legal standards to them, . . . a
decision-making process akin to a judicial act.’” 84 Additionally, the
ordinance required the BOC to hold a public hearing, give notice of the
hearing to the parties, and make a decision that was particular and
immediate. 85
In a footnote, the Riverdale Land Group, LLC court quoted the City of
Cumming court’s assessment that “‘it is not clear that [SUP] cases are
meaningfully different from variance cases in [the context of determining
whether certiorari relief is available] at least in the cases where the
zoning board must apply a set of factors set out in the zoning ordinance
to the specific facts [of the SUP].’” 86 The court further noted that whether
the decision is “tightly controlled” by the ordinance is only one factor the
court considers when determining whether a decision is quasi-judicial or
legislative. 87 The court recited the declaration in City of Cumming that
“[s]ubstance matters far more than form, and the courts need not
capitulate to the label that a government body places on its action,” in
ordinance, pleading, or statute. 88 To that end, like in York, the court in
Riverdale Land Group held that ZPL’s characterization of SUPs as
legislative zoning decisions was not determinative. 89 The court, in
another footnote, rejected RLG’s argument that City of Cumming was
distinguishable because the variance ordinance in City of Cumming
required that all factors under the ordinance must be satisfied before a
variance could be granted and the SUP ordinance in Riverdale Land

82 Riverdale Land Group, LLC, 354 Ga. App. at 4, 840 S.E.2d at 134 (quoting Int’l
Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. at 401, 788 S.E.2d at 463).
83 Id. at 5, 840 S.E.2d. at 135. In City of Cumming, homeowners sought a writ of
mandamus regarding the board of zoning’s decision to grant a setback variance to a
neighboring developer. City of Cumming, 300 Ga. at 820.
84 Id. at 6, 840 S.E.2d at 136 (quoting City of Cumming, 300 Ga. at 823).
85 Id. at 6–7, 840 S.E.2d at 136 (finding that the Board’s decision was final, binding, and
conclusive of the rights of the parties).
86 Id. at 4, 840 S.E.2d at 135 n.16 (quoting 300 Ga. 827 (2017)).
87 Id. at 6 n. 23, 840 S.E.2d at 136.
88 Id. at 8, 840 S.E.2d at 137.
89 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 137.
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Group stated that the board may examine factors. 90 But, a few days later,
the Georgia Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion on another
SUP case.
C. Davis v. Rockdale Art Farm, Inc.: the Georgia Court of Appeals
Followed ZPL and Held that Approval of an SUP can be Legislative.
In Davis v. Rockdale Art Farm, Inc., 91 the Rockdale County Board of
Commissioners (BOC) granted an SUP for a creative arts learning center.
Owners of properties approximately three-tenths of a mile from, and at a
higher elevation than, the arts center (collectively, the neighbors)
appealed the BOC’s decision by petition for writ of certiorari to superior
court. 92 The neighbors alleged they would suffer from increased noise,
light pollution, and traffic as a result of the art center. 93 The local
government and the applicant challenged the neighbors’ standing for the
first time on appeal. 94
The Georgia Court of Appeals found the BOC’s approval of the SUP
was a legislative action because it was based on a discretionary
determination by the BOC as to whether the application satisfied certain
criteria or conditions prescribed by ordinance. 95 Because the decision was
legislative, the court held the county was not required to raise the
standing of the neighbors at the hearing before the BOC on the SUP. 96
Whether a party has standing to challenge a zoning decision has long
been determined through the application of the two-step “substantial
interest-aggrieved citizen” test. 97 “First, . . . a person claiming to be
aggrieved must have a substantial interest in the zoning decision, and
second, . . . this interest [must] be in danger of suffering some special
damage or injury not common to all property owners similarly
situated.” 98 The court found the neighbors failed to satisfy this test
because they did not distinguish how the alleged adverse effects resulting

Id. at 4 n. 16, 840 S.E.2d at 135.
354 Ga. App. 82, 840 S.E.2d 160 (2020).
92 Id. 82–83, 840 S.E.2d 161–62.
93 Id. at 83, 840 S.E.2d at 162.
94 Id. at 84, 840 S.E.2d at 162.
95 Id. at 86, 840 S.E.2d at 164. The Court further reasoned that zoning power is
legislative because the purpose of an SUP is “to authorize a type of land use potentially
incompatible with uses allowed in the particular zoning district, with issuance of the permit
predicated upon compliance with conditions set out in the ordinance, or in the discretion of
the local zoning authority.” Id. at 85, 840 S.E.2d at 163.
96 Id. at 86, 840 S.E.2d at 164.
97 Massey v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 244, 246–48, 637 S.E.2d 385, 387–88 (2006).
98 DeKalb Cnty. v. Wapensky, 253 Ga. 47, 48, 315 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1984).
90
91
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from the art center would harm them differently from other property
owners in the area. 99
The court went on to hint at (but not elucidate) a further distinction
between quasi-judicial and legislative decisions—the standing of public
opponents to be heard by the governing authority. The court quoted
Powers Ferry Civic Association v. Life Insurance Company of Georgia, 100
as follows: “‘the standing of neighbors to [appeal a] rezoning granted a
property owner’ and ‘the standing of neighbors to be heard by a governing
authority when considering a proposed zoning change are two separate
and distinct things.’” 101 The court stated in Davis,
[t]o hold otherwise would, as the county appellees argue[d], require an
agency, “to include as a part of its preliminary announcements, prior
to each and every meeting, that the specific agency objects to the
standing of each and every applicant and application as to any
determination that may or may not be made by the agency in order to
preserve affirmative defense.” 102

In essence—although not entirely to the catastrophic result suggested
by the county—that was the effect of the majority decision in York. After
York, in order to preserve all issues for appeal in case the decision was
deemed to be quasi-judicial, many zoning applicants (including those
represented by the Authors) tendered (and will continue to tender)
written, broad legal objections of every conceivable kind and iteration
and tie those objections to specific facts in the application material or
presented at the public hearing.
At first glance, the court’s decision in Davis appears in every respect
to conflict with the majority decision in York and Riverdale Land Group.
The ordinance at issue in York required a County Board of
Commissioners to give “due consideration” to ten “objective criteria” set
forth in the ordinance. 103 The court in York held that the SUP decision
was quasi-judicial because “although the grant of the [SUP] ultimately
authorized a change in use of land, . . . the [SUP was] . . . ‘sought under
terms set out in the ordinance,’ and the [governing authority] therefore
acted in a ‘quasi-judicial capacity to determine the facts and apply the
law.’” 104 In contrast to the ordinances in York and Riverdale Land Group,
the ordinance in Davis “specifically direct[ed] the Board to use its
Davis, 354 Ga. App. at 165, 840 S.E.2d at 88.
250 Ga. 419, 297 S.E.2d 477 (1982).
101 Davis, 354 Ga. App. at 87, 840 S.E.2d at 164 (quoting Powers, 250 Ga. at 421, 297
S.E.2d at 478).
102 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 164.
103 York, 348 Ga. App at 58, 821 S.E.2d at 122.
104 Id. at 63, 821 S.E.2d at 125.
99

100
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discretion and to consider other factors, including ‘the consistency of the
application with the comprehensive plan.’” 105
The difference between the majority in York and in Davis is that the
court in Davis may have finally given due consideration and deference to
the legislative pronouncement in ZPL that approval of an SUP is a final
legislative act by a local government. 106 Specifically, the court found that
the SUP was a zoning decision or legislative act because it authorized a
type of land use potentially incompatible with the primarily agricultural
and residential uses allowed in the underlying zoning district. 107
The decisions defined by ordinance in both York, Riverdale Land
Group, and Davis could be deemed legislative. The only discernable
difference appears to be the use of the words “due consideration,” “may,”
and “discretion,” respectively, in the ordinances describing the local
government decisions at issue in each case. 108 Therefore, under the
York/Davis dichotomy, the only difference between a quasi-judicial and
a legislative decision is the use of the word “discretion” or similar
language. Of course, after York, “due consideration” does not
automatically make a local government’s decision legislative. However,
using this framework, decisions that historically have been quasijudicial, such as a variance or plat approval, could be legislative if
discretionary language is in the ordinance. The converse is also true—in
the absence of the language of discretion, a historically legislative
decision (such as a rezoning) could be quasi-judicial. On appeal, the
appellate path for quasi-judicial decisions, certiorari proceedings in
superior court, are procedurally more favorable to local governments
because of, for example, the deferential “any evidence” standard. Thus,
in light of Davis, it might benefit local governments to review their zoning
ordinance for, and if necessary amend those ordinances to remove
discretionary (or similar) language.
III. MILANI V. IRWIN—IMPACT TO THE VIEW FROM A NEIGHBOR’S
PROPERTY IS STILL SUFFICIENT TO BESTOR THE NEIGHBOR WITH
STANDING
In Milani v. Irwin, 109 a developer acquired in unincorporated DeKalb
County one lot fronting on a small lake in an established single-family
residential neighborhood. 110 While demolishing the existing singlefamily home on the lot, an activity permitted by the County’s Planning
Davis, 354 Ga. App. at 86, 840 S.E.2d at 163–64.
Id., 840 S.E.2d at 164.
107 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 164.
108 See York, 348 Ga. App. at 65, 821 S.E.2d at 126 (Goss, J., dissenting).
109 354 Ga. App. 218, 840 S.E.2d 700 (2020).
110 Id. at 219, 840 S.E.2d at 702.
105
106
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Director (the director), the developer cut down trees within the County’s
undisturbed buffer around a State Water, an unpermitted activity. 111
Some of those trees were also within the smaller twenty-five foot State
Water buffer. 112 A variance from the State Water buffer was retroactively
granted by the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia
Department of Natural Resources. 113 And, the County notified the
developer that the tree removal was illegal. The developer applied for,
and the director granted, a permit to replant trees within the county
buffer. 114 The director also determined that the developer did not need a
permit to build a seawall because, under the applicable ordinance,
retaining walls of less than four feet do not require a permit. 115 The
owners of the property directly across the lake from the lot at issue
appealed the director’s decisions to the DeKalb County Zoning Board (the
Board), and the Board affirmed the director’s issuance of the permit and
the decision that the seawall did not require a permit. 116
The neighbors further appealed by way of petition for writ of certiorari
to the DeKalb County Superior Court. 117 The superior court sustained
the petition finding that the Board erred in affirming the director’s
decision. 118 The developer filed a discretionary appeal with the Georgia
Court of Appeals. 119 The developer argued that the neighbors failed to
meet the substantial interest-aggrieved citizen test for standing in
zoning cases. 120
The court in Milani found that the neighbors satisfied the “substantial
interest-aggrieved citizen” test and, as a result, had standing. 121
Specifically, the court found that “property owners ‘who will bear the
brunt of the changed conditions’ . . . have a substantial interest in the
Id., 840 S.E.2d at 702–03. A State Water is
any and all river[], stream[], creek[], branch[], lake[], reservoir[], pond[],
drainage system[], spring[], well[], and other bod[y] of surface or subsurface
water, natural and artificial, lying within or forming a part of the boundaries of
the State which [is] not entirely confined and retained completely upon the
property of a single individual, partnership, or corporation, except[ing] . . . any
project carried out under the technical supervision of the Natural Resources
Conservation Service of the United States Department of Agriculture.
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 391-3-7-.01(aa)(2020); O.C.G.A. § 12-7-17(7)(2020).
112 Milani, 354 Ga. App. at 219, 840 S.E.2d at 703; O.C.G.A. § 12-7-6(b)(15) (2020).
113 Id. at 219–20, 840 S.E.2d at 703.
114 Id. at 220, 840 S.E.2d at 703.
115 Id. at 219–20, 840 S.E.2d at 703.
116 Id. at 220, 840 S.E.2d at 703.
117 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 703.
118 Id. at 221, 840 S.E.2d at 703.
119 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 704.
120 Id. at 222–23, 840 S.E.2d at 704–05.
121 Id. at 223, 840 S.E.2d at 705.
111
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action” and may have standing. 122 Because the neighbors’ lot was directly
across the lake from the developer’s property, the court reasoned that the
homeowners had a particular and individualized concrete injury
uncommon to other residents in the subdivision because of the “visual
intrusion” presented by the developer’s bare cut lot located directly across
the lake from their property. 123
The court also held the superior court properly sustained the
homeowner’s petition for certiorari because the tree replanting plan
approved by the Board did not comply with the formula in DeKalb County
ordinance for calculating the replanting requirements for illegally
removed trees. 124 The developer’s permitted plantings did not follow that
formula. As a result, the director violated the ordinance. 125 Consequently,
the trial court erred by not sustaining the petition for writ of certiorari. 126
Milani follows a line of cases finding standing where neighbors object to
the impact to the view from their property (and corresponding reduction
in property values) resulting from a local government’s zoning or land
use decision. 127
IV. SWEET CITY LANDFILL, LLC V. LYON—THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT AND
A RECURRING CASE
In Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Lyon, 128 a proposed landfill in Elbert
County again made its way to the Georgia Court of Appeals. 129 In this
new, separate case, Sweet City claimed that in a private meeting prior to
the public hearing on Sweet City’s SUP, members of the Elbert County
Board of Commissioners (BOC), in violation of the Georgia Open
Meetings Act, 130 planned to vote against that SUP without discussion. 131
The court first addressed Sweet City’s claims for bad faith and
intentional misconduct. 132 The court looked to the immunity from civil
lability afforded to members of (among other things) the governing
Id. at 223, 840 S.E.2d at 705 (quoting DeKalb Cnty., 253 Ga. at 49, 315 S.E.2d at 875.
Id., 840 S.E.2d at 705.
124 Id. at 224, 840 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting DeKalb County Code § 14-39(p)(2)).
125 Id. at 224–25, 840 S.E.2d at 706.
126 Id., 840 S.E.2d at 706.
127 See DeKalb Cnty., 253 Ga. at 47, 315 S.E.2d at 873; see also Hitch v. Vasarhelyi, 285
Ga. 627, 680 S.E.2d 411 (2009).
128 352 Ga. App. 824 (2019).
129 For a background and analysis on the prior cases involving this project, please refer
to Newton M. Galloway & Steven L. Jones, Zoning and Land Use, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 71 Mercer L. Rev. 363 and Newton M. Galloway & Steven L. Jones, Zoning and Land
Use, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 69 Mercer L. Rev. 371.
130 O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1–50-14-5 (2020).
131 Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 352 Ga. App. at 825, 835 S.E.2d at 769.
132 Id. at 827, 835 S.E.2d at 770.
122
123
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authorities (and inferior zoning boards) of local governments under
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-20(a), which provides as follows:
A person serving with or without compensation as a member, director,
or trustee, or as an officer of the board without compensation, of any
nonprofit hospital or association or of any nonprofit, charitable, or
eleemosynary institution or organization or of any local governmental
agency, board, authority, or entity shall be immune from civil liability
for any act or any omission to act arising out of such service if such
person was acting in good faith within the scope of his or her official
actions and duties and unless the damage or injury was caused by the
willful or wanton misconduct of such person. 133

The standard for bad faith is high. It “is not simply bad judgment or
negligence” but instead, to prove bad faith, a litigant must show a
dishonest purpose, willful conduct with an actual intention to harm, or
wanton conduct that is so reckless or charged with indifference to the
consequences as to justify the jury in finding a wantonness equivalent in
spirit to actual intent. 134 The court held the BOC’s actions were within
its members official duties. The court further held that Sweet City did
not plead that any action of the BOC was “adopted, taken, or made” in
violation of the Georgia Open Meetings Act outside of a public meeting. 135
Sweet City failed to demonstrate bad faith because the action at issue
took place during a public meeting. 136 Thus, the BOC members were
entitled to statutory immunity. 137
Additionally, Sweet City argued the Commission abused its power
because it first decided to vote against the Sweet City landfill project in
a private meeting, even though it later voted at a public meeting not to
hear Sweet City’s plan. 138 The court held Sweet City’s abuse of power
claim was rendered moot because the BOC publicly reaffirmed its actions
in a later public meeting. 139

See O.C.G.A. § 51-1-20(a) (2020).
Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 352 Ga. App. at 828, 835 S.E.2d at 771 (quoting Culpepper
v. Thompson, 254 Ga. App. 569, 570, 562 S.E.2d 837, 839 (2002).
135 Sweet City Landfill, LLC, 352 Ga. App. at 827–28, 835 S.E.2d at 770.
136 Id. at 828, 835 S.E.2d at 770–71.
137 Id., 835 S.E.2d at 771.
138 Id. at 835, 835 S.E.2d at 775.
139 Id., 835 S.E.2d at 775. The court also held that (1) Sweet City did not allege facts
sufficient for the statute of limitations under the Open Meetings Act to be tolled under
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 due to the BOC’s alleged fraudulent acts; Id. at 828, 835 S.E.2d at 771;
(2) although “the trial court erred by not providing notice that it planned to consider
matters outside the pleadings in rendering its decision [on the BOC’s motion to dismiss], . . .
the deficient notice in this case [was] not reversible error;” Id. at 832, 835 S.E.2d at 773;
and (3) res judicata barred Sweet City’s claims because “Sweet City [did] not identif[y] any
133
134
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Sweet City Landfill, LLC clarified that members of a governing
authority (or inferior zoning board) may, prior to and outside of a public
hearing, permissibly discuss a pending land use or zoning application
and decide how they will act on that application so long as the official
action (i.e., vote) occurs during a public meeting. Of course, the local
government must ensure that, if the action is arguably a quasi-judicial
decision, the record is sufficiently preserved to satisfy the “any evidence”
standard on appeal.

action by the [BOC] subsequent to events of the earlier case which deprived Sweet City of
any rights relative to the proposed land fill project . . . .” Id. at 837, 835 S.E.2d at 776.

